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Securitization of Migration: an Australian case study of global trends*





Post September 11 migration has increasingly been framed as a security problem. In the 2010 Australian election
campaign migration was connected to security (defense of our borders, terrorism and social cohesion) and to related
issues of insecurity about the future (population size, sustainability and economic growth). This framing of migration
as a national security issue overlooks the reality that Australian immigration is part of the global flow of population.
Migration is an international issue experienced by states as a national question of border control and sovereignty
seeking to manage the consequences of global inequality and mobility. This paper analyses the 'security turn' in mi-
gration debates in Australia and the North and the way the securitization of migration signifies the transformation
of security from the problem of producing national order to the problem of managing global disorder resulting in
the merging of national and international security strategies.
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Resumen
Luego de los acontecimientos del 11 de Septiembre, la migración se ha enmarcado cada vez más como un problema
de seguridad. En la campaña electoral australiana en 2010, la migración estaba conectada con la seguridad (defensa
de nuestras fronteras, terrorismo y cohesión social) y con cuestiones vinculadas con la inseguridad sobre el futuro
(tamaño de la población, sostenibilidad y crecimiento económico). Este tratamiento de la migración como un asunto
de seguridad nacional pasa por alto la realidad de que la inmigración australiana es parte del flujo global de población.
La migración es un asunto internacional experienciado por los Estados como una cuestión nacional de control de las
fronteras y la soberanía que busca gestionar las consecuencias de las desigualdades mundiales y la movilidad. Este
trabajo analiza el ‘giro de seguridad’ en los debates sobre migración en Australia y el Norte, y las formas en que el
aseguramiento contra la migración significa la transformación de la seguridad desde el problema de producir un
orden nacional al problema de la gestión del desorden global que resulta de la fusión de estrategias de seguridad
nacionales e internacionales.
Palabras clave: Migración; Securitización; Hiper-gobernanza; Australia; Transnacionalización. 
* An earlier version of this paper was published as Humphrey, Michael. 2013. “Migration, security, insecurity." Journal of Intercultural
Studies 34(2):178-195.
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University of Sydney.





























































After the international terrorist attacks on 11
September 2001 international migration has increa-
singly been framed as a security problem in the West.
Borders and entry have become first and foremost an
issue of security. At national borders immigration ser-
vices no longer merely scrutinise the validity of docu-
ments and grant permission to enter but provide
‘border protection’ by assessing the risk of passengers
as potential criminals, terrorists or visa over-stayers
based on their documents, security profiling, biome-
trics and matrix of databanks. Internationally North
borders are increasingly militarised to control unwan-
ted entry. The Australian government’s military opera-
tions to ‘stop the boats’ on the high seas (Morrison,
2013), the Texas governor’s deployment of the National
Guard in response to the arrival over a period of 6
months 57,000 minors from Central America1 and Fron-
tex’s militarization of the Mediterraneanto contain mi-
gration from Africa are all examples of the enhanced
militarization of North borders. The security function
of the state has expanded beyond national defense
through military preparedness to encompass the pro-
tection of citizens through the intensification of survei-
llance of our organizationally and technologically
complex societies to manage public anxiety about un-
certainty. Agencies whose functions were once regar-
ded as marginal to state security (immigration,
customs, ambulance) have now become integral to it
and their officers/officials increasingly publicly encoun-
tered as security-like in their ready-for-action dress. Se-
curity has become a pervasive discourse of
governments to frame and give priority to public policy
targeting existential threats (Buzan et al.,1998: 25).
The securitization of migration, the construc-
tion of migration as risk, is an expression of the glo-
balization of security to manage the new threats of
international crime and terrorism post-September
11.Securitization is ‘a political technique of framing
policy questions in logics of survival with a capacity to
mobilize politics of fear in which social relations are
structured on the basis of distrust’ (Huysmans, 2006:
xi). Securitization policy is state-centric and reflects
the rationality of political elites and security profes-
sionals (Karyotis, 2012).It has become emblematic of
the anxieties of state sovereignty seeking to manage
migration as an expression of globalization - control
borders, plan population growth, promote social co-
hesion and support (middle class) sustainability. Each
of these issues refers to the national capacity to order
and regulate the population and, integral to that, to
derive legitimacy from being seen to care for and pro-
tect citizens and determine entitlement. Framing mi-
gration as a ‘security’ issue gives it political priority
and justifies extraordinary legal, policing and policy
measures to manage it (Leonard, 2007). By making
migration a security problem migrants are constituted
as the object of policies directed at managing risk. It
misrecognizes structural issues such as refugee flows,
urban riots, crime, unemployment and welfare de-
pendency as the attributes of migrants which need to
be policed and regulated. Blaming migrants becomes
a strategy of governance to produce social cohesion,
mobilize political support and claim political legiti-
macy. Moreover at the margins cultural and racial dif-
ference are used to define sovereignty and delineate
a state of exception for those seennot to deserve the
same protection of the law.
Securitization frames migration as a national
issue concerned with determining ‘who comes here’
Securitization of Migration: an Australian case study of global trends
1‘Texas Governor Rick Perry to deploy 1,000 troops to Mexican
border’, The Guardian 22 July 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jul/21/texas-governor-r ick-perry-troops-
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(controlling borders), enforcing visa requirements (lo-
cating overstayers), selecting the ‘best’ migrants, and
policing social categories as risk management. Howe-
ver in reality migration, the large scale transnational
flow of populations, is an international issue challen-
ging the capacity of individual states to manage the
impact of big structural questions: global inequality,
transnational social mobility and displacement of the
most vulnerable as a result of economic crisis, envi-
ronmental degradation and war. The ‘security turn’ in
relation to migration signifies the transformation of
security from the problem of producing national
order to the problem of managing global disorder. Na-
tionally governance has combined security (policing,
surveillance) with the management of citizen insecu-
rity and public perceptions of danger. Transnationally,
the state has outsourced security to other states, to
security professionals, corporations, international
agencies and NGOs (Bigo, 2008) for them to manage
unwanted immigrants through containment. This in-
cludes interception and detention en route as well as
trying to keep people at home through ‘human secu-
rity’ oriented development policies. This is referred to
as the ‘externalization’ of migration control (Paoletti,
2010). Securitization extends governmentality beyond
national borders by providing a common language to
connect diverse fields and create a shared political
project by ‘shaping political identities and subjectivi-
ties’ (Risley, 2006: 28).
This paper examines the securitization of mi-
gration and migrants as a national and transnational
project seeking to manage global disorder by firstly,
creating a transnational border in the North through
transnationally shared policies, laws and agency coo-
peration to manage international migration as risk,
secondly by turning particular kinds of migrants into
transnational categories for transnational manage-
ment – e.g. Muslim immigrants and refugees - and
thirdly, the hypergovernance of migrants along migra-
tion routes or in countries of origin by externalization
through outsourcing sovereignty to other states and
NGOs to intercept them on the way or keep (unwan-
ted) migrants at home. Hyper-governance refers to
the transnational management of populations, the
ability of some states to intervene in and shape other
states and societies as a neo-imperial project through
military action, humanitarian relief and NGOs organi-
zation of civil society to stop conflict, bring develop-
ment and support state building (Bhatt, 2007).
The aim of this paper is to develop a conceptual
framework to bring into focus transnationally emer-
gent patterns of governmentality revealed in the se-
curitization of migrants and migration. It considers the
Australian experience of the securitization of migrants
and migration through a focus on Muslims migrants
and refugees as transnationalized categories and
identifies parallel processes targeting these same mi-
grant categories in Europe. The paper draws on the
author’s extensive research on Muslims and Islam in
Australia as well as comparative research on Australia
and Europe (Humphrey, 1998; 2000; 2002; 2005;
2007;2009; 2010).While the empirical focus is on Aus-
tralia the policies and practices of the securitization
of migration are found at all North-South borders.
Theoretically the paper extends Watson (2011)’s in-
sight about the emergence of securitization as signif-
ying a crisis in institutionalized forms of security by
tracing the externalization of security with respect to
migrants and migration.
Securitization and Governance
Securitization of migration is not merely a stra-
tegy of policing and risk management it has become
a mode of governance. Securitization combines dis-
persed self-disciplining through surveillance (Fou-
cault, 1977) with collective disciplining through
citizen-spectatorship, and the management of fear
(Debord, 1977). Policing becomes less about repres-
sion and more about constituting the politically visible
through the mediatization of society (Feldman, 2004).
As Feldman argues, “the new surveillance/public sa-
fety regime requires the labor of spectator-citizenship
(2004: 77)”. Policing through the panopticon, the sur-
veillance of all under the state’s gaze, shifts towards
the ban-opticon, the constitution of risk objects by
profiling under the gaze of the citizen-spectator (Bigo,
2008). The ban-opticon is characterized by the “ex-
ceptionalism of power (rules of emergency and their
tendency to become permanent),by the way it exclu-
des certain groups in the name of their future poten-
tial behavior (profiling), and by the way it normalizes
the non-excluded through its production of normative
imperatives, the most important of which is free mo-
vement (the so-called four freedoms of circulation of
the EU: concerning goods, capital, information, servi-
ces and persons)” (Bigo, 2008: 32).
The ban-optic security lens institutes a form of
governmentality based on state management of une-
ase and by providing a “reassuring and protective pas-





























































trying to guarantee order to proactive policies desig-
ned to target risk categories, to anticipate future risk
scenarios and to manage the population’s feelings of
insecurity. The state’s aim is not primarily to make pe-
ople feel safe by guaranteeing order but to govern by
managing their feelings of insecurity which in turn be-
comes the basis of unity through exclusion of the
Other. The political technique of the ban-opticon dis-
places political order based on the social contract for
“misgiving as a mode of ruling” concentrating fear on
a difficult to identify adversary (Bigo, 2002: 81). It
makes risks legible in the categories it constructs and
identifies as the “enemy” (Krasmann, 2007). These so-
cial categories are produced through laws and policies
which identify the dangerous/subversive behavior at-
tributed to them and then made visible through poli-
cing social surfaces in the media witnessed by the
citizen-spectator. “This form of policing emerges with
the disappearance of enforceable physical national
borders and compensates for the loss of tangible bor-
ders by creating new boundary systems that are vir-
tual, mediatized such as electronic, bio-metric, and
digital surveillance nets” (Feldman, 2004: 74). 
Securitization involves the expansion of proac-
tive preventive measures and practices beyond the
state which draw on a wide range of agencies that ma-
nage risk which include insurance companies, private
investigators, retail superstores, banks and public wel-
fare institutions. Internationally, security becomes de-
centralized through outsourcing responsibility to
other states, international agencies, private compa-
nies and NGOs. New technologies of surveillance fa-
cilitate the emergence of transnational bureaucratic
networks and databanks created by the activities of
security professionals managing fear and risk (Bigo,
2008). Their professional activities and knowledge
transnationalize the security field; as the categories
of their surveillance and policing are themselves
transnationalized.
The securitization of migration has increasingly
become the securitization of migrants whose bodies
are made surrogate borders culturally and politically.
The effect of securitization is to diminish the rights of
those profiled as risk categories and to racialize or cul-
turalize the justification for treating particular trans-
nationalized categories differently. 
Securitized Muslims and Islam in Australia
Before 11 September 2001 Muslims in Australia
were stigmatized as a culturally problematic and so-
cially marginalized immigrant community (Humphrey,
1998; Dunn, 2004; Dunn et al., 2007). According to the
2006 census, Muslims are 1.7% of the Australian po-
pulation (340,393, 2006 census) and rapidly becoming
a second-generation Australian born population (38%,
2006 Census).2 The Muslim population is culturally
and geographically diverse with communities from
the Middle East, South Asia, South East Asia, East Asia
and Africa. However the impact of September 11 was
to transform Muslims from an ethnic/religious mino-
rity in a multicultural society to a transnational risk ca-
tegory, potential sources of religiously inspired
extremist violence (Humphrey, 2005). 
The securitization of Muslims made them a
focus for targeted policing as dangerous encultured
bodies nationally and transnationally (Humphrey,
2010; 2007). Although implemented nationally secu-
ritization is the product of transnational harmoniza-
tion of policies and law around counter-terrorism,
immigration and integration to manage Muslims and
Islam as a transnational risk category across Western
states. In general counter-terrorism measures have
provided exceptional powers to the state and seen
Muslims targeted as a risk category, immigration po-
licy has made it harder for Muslims to visit, migrate
and in some cases become citizens of Western coun-
tries and integration policies have policed cultural dif-
ference by supporting ‘moderate’ and rejecting
‘extremist’ forms of Muslim culture, religious leaders-
hip and community organization. 
After 11 September 2001 44 new anti-terror
laws were introduced under the Howard Coalition go-
vernment between 2001 to 2007 covering “(…) every-
thing from banning speech through to new sedition
laws to detention without charge or trial to control
orders that permit house arrest to closing down
courts from public view” (Williams, 2009). The poli-
tical effect of anti-terrorism laws has been to create
a perpetual state of emergency (reflected in the na-
tional terrorist alert status) and engender fear in Aus-
tralian citizens (Aly and Green, 2010). These
emergency laws define terrorism is broadly, proscri-
bed political groups deemed terrorist, allows deten-
tion without trial and criminalizes association with
anyone belonging to a proscribed terrorist organiza-
2 Muslims in Australia – a snap shot, Department of Immigration
and Citizenship, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/
multicultural/pdf_doc/Muslims_in_Australia_snapshot.pdf (ac-
cessed 6 August 2010).





























































tion, lock-down entire suburbs to conduct searches
without judicial approval, and to permit the rapid de-
portation of non-citizen residents considered security
risks (Rix, 2006).
In the introduction to the National Security Le-
gislation listed on the Australian Attorney-General’s
website the government frames the legislation as part
of international counter-terrorism efforts – “Australia
has long played a leading role in the development of
laws to combat terrorism”(cited in Rix, 2006: 431).Yet
because Australia has previously had limited expe-
rience with terrorism it had limited anti-terrorism le-
gislation, although colonial control orders regulating
the Australian Aboriginal population shared similar fe-
atures of detention, separation and sedition (Davis
and Watson, 2006). Because of the lack of anti-terro-
rism laws Australia borrowed anti-terrorism laws
mainly for the United Kingdom (Lynch, 2008). Howe-
ver international terrorism has been a catalyst for the
growing international harmonization of anti-terrorism
laws changing its status as a normal crime under na-
tional law to being an illegal act under international
law (Nuotio, 2006).This has occurred through the re-
plication of laws and through its Global Counter-Te-
rrorism Strategy launched in 2006 - however the
Convention on International Terrorism is still being ne-
gotiated.3
The harmonization of counter-terrorism laws
produces a securitized transnational space which fa-
cilitates global surveillance, policing and prosecution
which is reinforced by the ban-optic global media wit-
nessing of Western publics of terrorist events. The cu-
rrent extent of global mass surveillance has been
revealed by whistle-blowers – Julian Assange through
Wikileaks and Edward Snowden a former employee
of the US National Security Agency.4 Local-global me-
diation of terrorist events, even at a large geographi-
cal distance, constantly remind Western spectator-
citizens (us) that they (we) are potential targets the-
reby tying the national space into a transnationally se-
curitized shared space. In Australia the Dr Haneef case
highlighted the way this securitized transnational
space was activated and made visible by a terrorist
event in the United Kingdom. The attempted car bom-
bings by Dr Bilal Abdulla and Safeel Ahmed against
targets in London and Glasgow on 30 June 2007 re-
sulted in the detention of Dr Mohammed Haneef, a
second cousin of Safeel Ahmed, in Brisbane under
Australian anti-terrorism laws.5 The kinship connec-
tion, the alleged evidence of a mobile phone SIM card
connecting the cousins, the close working relationship
between Australian and UK police and intensive Aus-
tralian media witnessing of this UK terrorist event cre-
ated the public perception that it was as if the event
had taken place in Australia. Eventually all charges
were dropped against Dr Haneef but the case high-
lighted how counter-terrorism policing could use a
highly visible spectacle of terrorism to exercice highly
secretive and broadly unaccountable powers to hold
Dr Haneef in detention and, even after the case was
dismissed, continue his detention through the legal
capacity of the Minister for Immigration to withdraw
his residency visa on character grounds (Pickering and
McCulloch, 2010).
Parallel with the securitization of Muslims in
Australia is their domestication. While securitization
essentializes Muslims as a transnational risk category
domestication establishes the line between accepta-
ble and unacceptable migrants. In Australia the public
scrutiny of migrant ‘performance’ – fitting in, making
an effort to adjust – has gone hand in hand with a
mass migration program whose aim was to select the
‘best’ migrants. For some time, Muslim migrants have
been judged to be problem immigrants- unwilling to
work, too bound by tradition, too controlling of their
women, too slow to learn English and, most recently,
too unwilling to integrate and become Australian
(Humphrey, 1998). However this Australian national
discourse on migrant ‘performance’ has became
transnationalized in the form of ‘citizenship tests’ now
fashionable in the North America, EU and Australia
(Löwenheim and Gazit, 2009). These tests constitute
a neo-liberal citizenship, a citizenship that has to be
earned (Van Houdt and Schinkel, 2011).
But the moral panic around terrorism means
that social inclusion is not determined merely by ‘ci-
tizenship tests’ but by the successful performance of
being recognized as a ‘good Muslim’ (Humphrey,
2007). Muslim identity and Islam are made the mar-
gins of citizenship. The ‘homegrown’ terrorist attacks
in London in 7 July 2005; terrorism attacks by British
Pakistanis put integration at the top of the political
management of Muslim communities in Australia and
the EU. Muslim cultural difference was increasingly
constructed as cultural resistance and signified poten-
3 See UN Action to Counter Terrorism. http://www.un.org/terro-
rism/instruments.shtml (accessed 20 June 2012).
4 The NSA Files, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/the-nsa-files (accessed 6 August 2014).
5 ‘Haneef related to UK terror suspect’ ABC On-line News, 6 Fri
2007,http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/07/06/






























































tial ‘extremist’ views. In 2006, the former Prime Mi-
nister John Howard explicitly targeted Muslims for
their unwillingness to integrate accusing them of
being unwilling to learn English and not adopting Aus-
tralian values especially in regard to treating women
equally (Duffy, 2006). In a similar vein Mr Peter Cos-
tello,6 the former Treasurer and Deputy Leader of the
Liberal Party, declared there would be no ‘Shari’a’ in
Australia making Shari’ asignify a very essentialized
view of Islam as culturally backward, intolerant and
separatist. For Australian Muslims the actual practice
of Shari’agenerally means the religious law concerned
with family law and inheritance (Humphrey, 1998). 
The domestication of Islam and Muslims in Aus-
tralia, and in Europe, has sought to produce ‘national’
Islams- in President Sarkozy’s phrase “to be Muslims of
France practicing an Islam of France” (Bowen, 2004: 43)
- and thereby build moderate Islamic leadership and
institutions. Post 7 July 2005 London bombings domes-
tication aimed at preventing Islamic radicalization
amongst Muslim immigrants and their children. As a
cultural classification by Western governments the
term ‘moderate Islam’ is primarily a political judgment
about loyalty and values (Modood and Ahmad, 2007;
Aly, 2005). Firstly, a ‘moderate Muslim’ is anti-terrorism
and against the use of Islam as a militant political rhe-
toric. Secondly, a ‘moderate Muslim’ is also one who
holds modern and progressive views on the religious
interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith. The idea of a
Euro-Islam, a secularized Islam informed by human
rights, would be viewed as the most progressive posi-
tion (AlSayyad and Castells, 2002).  Thirdly, while it may
appear to mark out a middle ground from a Western
perspective the term moderate is pejorative for many
Muslims. It be interpreted as meaning a Muslim who is
co-opted and represents no-one or even worse is so se-
cular that more religious members of the Muslim dias-
pora would regard them as lapsed ‘Muslims’.
Domestication of Islam in Australia has been
particularly focused on Islamic religious leadership
and organizations. The Australian state has tried to
create more centralized and authoritative national Is-
lamic organizations to counteract the historical ab-
sence of a church like structure in Islam and the
pattern of ethnic fragmentation of religious organiza-
tions and structures in Australia (Yusuf, 2005).The Aus-
tralian Federal government appointed a Muslim
Advisory Council to regulate the appointment of Isla-
mic clerics, especially those from overseas, and the po-
sition of Mufti. The Council’s first task was to review
the suitability of the incumbent Mufti Tajad-din al Hi-
lali, a controversial Muslim leader based in the influen-
tial Lebanese Muslim community, to continue in his
national religious leadership role (McGrath, 2006). The
Australian government also supported the creation of
an Australian National Imams Council (ANIC) to create
a register of imams, promote the local training of
imams and to make them more accountable to the
ANIC than their mosque communities.
As in Europe Muslim women have been a pro-
minent focus of domestication in Australia. The focus
on women continues an earlier colonial pattern of in-
tervention in Muslim societies which viewed Muslim
women as vehicles for cultural change (Massell, 1974;
Abu-Lughod, 2002). Laws and policies targeting Mus-
lim women have invariably been justified on the
grounds of gender protection and human rights. The
veil viewed as a symbolic marker of Muslim gender
oppression has been a constant focus of Australian
domestication practices, however unlike Europe vei-
ling (hijab) has been legislated against, in Australia the
veil is ‘tolerated’ but nevertheless widely regarded as
an oppressive symbol of Muslim patriarchy (Yaxley,
2005). Other Muslim gendered cultural practices of
Muslim immigrants that have been criminalized in-
clude legislation against female genital mutilation
(FGM) (Crimes Act 1900 –Sect 45) and arranged/for-
ced marriage (Mercer, 2005). Even though these laws
are culturally neutral they are popularly understood
to as targeting oppressive Muslim practices against
women and designed to protect Muslim women and
support their fuller integration into Australian society
(Family Law Council, 1994).7
A critical aspect of the present securitizing of
Islam and Muslims is the way ‘culture’ is being cons-
tructed under globalization. The nation-state is seeking
to manage Islam as a transnational cultural system wi-
thin a national imaginary which is re-emphasizing cul-
tural singularity to reassert sovereignty and unity. The
focus on the radicalization of Australian Muslims
(home grown)8 only reinforces the construction of a
shared transnational category, now conceived as even
6ABC News Online, 2006. “Costello defends Muslim Citizenship
comments”, February 24, http://www.abc.net.au/news/sto-
ries/2006/02/24/1577268.htm  (accessed 06/06/09).
7 Given there are first generation migrants from Egypt, Somalia,
Ethiopia, and Sudan, African countries with some of the highest
levels of FGM, the practice certainly continues in Australia (Ma-
thews, 2011).
8 See the Building Identity and Resisting Radicalization (BIRR) In-
itiative, http://www.birr.net.au/about/about.html





























































more dangerous and increasing the risk of terrorism
(Schmitt, 2013). Paradoxically the Salafist project to
recreate the Islamic Caliphate engages in the same es-
sentialized transnational culture project but with very
different political goals of dismantling nation-states
not defending them (Bhatt, 2014).Securitizing Islam
represents a bureaucratic response of classification to
try to manage potential threats to disorder. Hence cu-
rrent racism towards Muslims (coined as Islamophobia
in Europe) is not just a legacy of orientalism reawake-
ned by international jihadist violence but has become
integral to the processes of governance as risk mana-
gement. Securitization only reinforces the essentiali-
zation of cultural difference as a strategy to make
threats legible and to provide a target for public an-
xieties. Muslim resistance to this bureaucratic project
of cultural essentialization has provoked its counter
essentialization in the defense of authenticity and re-
authorizing of tradition including Muslim revivalist and
neo-fundamentalist projects of the recovery of ‘pris-
tine’ Islam (Werbner, 2004).
Hypergovernance of borders
Integral to the national securitization of migra-
tion at home has been the risk management of trans-
national migration flows to prevent the arrival of
illegal immigrants, asylum seekers and unwanted cul-
tural and political influences from diasporas. Hyper-
governance of migration is increasingly taking a
militarized turn by not just securitising migrants and
potential migrants but by making them targets of
“state counterinsurgency” of “ungoverned space”
(Bhatt, 2014). The thrust of transnational manage-
ment of unwanted migration has been to stop migra-
tion flows arriving at their borders through
deterrence, interception and intervention. Dete-
rrence seeks to prevent people leaving home by im-
plementing a restrictive and harsh policies which
shrink asylum rights under the Refugee Convention,
interception seeks to prevent their arrival at the bor-
der through detention and immediate return policies
and intervention seeks to “stabilize” local communi-
ties of origin through security, state building and de-
velopment to produce local ‘stabilization’ to prevent
departure. When the Australian Prime Minister Julia
Gillard in 2010 announced Labor’s new regional policy
to process ‘illegal boat arrivals off-shore’ [“A boat ride
to Australia would just be a ticket back to the regional
processing centre,”] (Levy, 2010) she was imitating,
not just the Coalition’s tough line of reintroducing the
“Pacific Solution”9 (force the processing of asylum
claims off-shore in an excised migration zone or
neighbouring country) but the EU’s complex system
of treaties, agreements and practices erecting new
kinds of borders/barriers to prevent the movement
of people towards Europe. The securitization of mi-
gration flows constructs ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘refu-
gees’ – those not arriving through the normal
regulated channels - as a problem of ‘border protec-
tion’ which in Australia has been as much about ma-
naging the number of illegal boat arrivals as it is
managing public worrying about too many boats arri-
ving. In Australia, as has occurred in North America
and Europe, the securitization of asylum seekers as
potential terrorists has only served to raise the bar to
be granted asylum status.
In Europe the securitization of migration was
linked to the political project of EU integration. Immi-
gration emerged as a major focus of EU harmoniza-
tion of policy and laws from the early 1990s. The
Dublin Convention (1990), the Treaty of Amsterdam
and European Council (Tampere) Common Asylum
Policy (2000) all aimed at the harmonization of EU as-
ylum and migration policies to create a common bor-
der. Harmonization of immigration and asylum
policies inside was complemented by transferring
border controls to non-European states thereby dis-
tancing the problem from EU borders (Humphrey,
2002). The consequence of outsourcing was the cre-
ation of a series of concentric borders. The first circle
was the EU, ‘fortress Europe.’ The second circle con-
sisted of the states aspiring to join the EU—that is,
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE countries). The third
9 ‘In September 2001 Parliament passed the Migration Amend-
ment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 and The Migration
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Pro-
visions) Bill 2001, giving legislative effect to the Pacific Solution.
The Bills amended the Migration Act 1958 to excise Christmas,
Ashmore, Cartier and Cocos (Keeling) Islands from the migration
zone. As a result, any unlawful non-citizen attempting to enter
Australia via one of these islands was now prevented from making
a valid application for a protection visa unless the Minister for Im-
migration determined that it was in the public interest for that
person to do so. On 19 September 2001 Australia signed an Ad-
ministrative Agreement with Nauru to accommodate asylum se-
ekers for the duration of the processing of their applications. This
was replaced by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed
on 11 December 2001. Australia also signed an MOU with Papua
New Guinea on 11 October 2001, allowing the construction of a
processing centre to accommodate and assess the claims of as-
ylum seekers on Manus Island. The centres were managed by the































































circle encompassed the former Soviet Union (CIS),
Turkey and North Africa. The designated role of these
states was to enforce European border laws at their
own borders. The fourth circle was the “Middle East,
China and Black Africa” where EU policy sought to eli-
minate ‘push factors’ for migration and refugee flows
through a combination of security intervention and
development assistance programs.
The first three concentric circles involved out-
sourcing border controls to non-EU governments,
agencies and businesses to manage the transit of mi-
grants towards Europe. For example, the European
Commission entered into an agreement with the Lib-
yan government to establish detention centers with
the UNHCR acting as a mediator to assure their hu-
manitarian management. Financial sanctions have
been imposed against haulage contractors transpor-
ting people with invalid documents (up to US$
630,000) and the obligation to return those intercep-
ted to the point of departure. The EU agency Frontex
is an example of the decentralization of control “be-
yond any democratic oversight, and it also enables Eu-
ropean countries to evade the obligations that apply
to their territory because of commitments made to
fundamental rights” (Morice and Rodier, 2010: 8). In-
terception of illegal boat arrivals has become a ‘push-
back’ and not a rescue exercise. The Italian navy either
redirects boats away from shore under their ‘push
back’ policy or transfers passengers to boats of a co-
llaborating country – until recently onto Libyan vessels
(CPT Report, 2010: 15; Paoletti, 2010).
Since the 1990s, Australian governments have
managed asylum seekers through a combination of
harsh onshore deterrence policies designed to under-
mine their rights under the Refugee Convention and
a series of regional agreements denying asylum see-
kers access to onshore processing and Australian
courts. The features of both Coalition and Labor party
immigration and asylum policies closely resemble cu-
rrent EU practices: long term detention of ‘illegal arri-
vals’ and asylum seekers, slowdown in asylum
processing of particular categories,10 increased use of
the deportation of ‘illegals’, the enlistment of neigh-
bouring countries in border controls, the negotiated
creation of detention centers in neighbouring coun-
tries with UNHCR officials assuming responsibility for
asylum assessment, the transfer of boats arrivals to
neighbouring countries, and the adoption of a ‘push-
back’ policy for ‘illegal boat arrivals’. The arrival of
boats engenders a political crisis and justifies tougher
controls, a phenomenon Mountz (2010) has also ob-
served in Canada. However the removal of processing
offshore denies asylum applicants the right to appeal
to Australian court and also renders them politically
invisible to the Australian public and therefore beyond
compassion. Their individual human stories of perso-
nal suffering are unheard and their claims for protec-
tion as refugees are subordinated to combating
international crime. In Orwellian speak combating in-
ternational crime is constructed as an ‘humanitarian’
policy in which ‘stopping people smugglers’ making
money out of the misery of asylum seekers by endan-
gering their lives (Humphrey, 2002). Just as has occu-
rred in the EU, the Australian government has made
illegal migrants and refugees “the target of a discourse
that justifies combating them in order to help them”
(Morice and Rodier, 2010: 8).
In the fourth concentric circle of regions - Mid-
dle East, China and Black Africa –EU policy has focused
on the containment of unwanted migrants and un-
wanted politics (terrorism) in their places of origin.
From the early 1990s, the EU identified migration and
refugee flows as a key security issue in post Cold-War
Europe. Since then, wars and international terrorism
have only reinforced this perception and intensified
hypergovernance of migration and refugees  – e.g. the
impact of the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the on-
going wars in the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan,
Syria) and Africa (Somalia, Sudan), the September 11
attacks, military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq,
international jihadist terrorists attacks in Europe and
the political fallout of the Arab Spring throughout the
Middle East. For this outer circle, the Action Plans re-
commended a comprehensive approach to migration
policy through political, human rights and develop-
ment agendas which included alleviating poverty, cre-
ating employment, improving living conditions,
preventing conflict, consolidating democracy and
strengthening the rule of law and addressing the
rights of minorities, women and children. By targeting
the main ‘refugee-producing’ countries the EU aimed
at alleviating ‘push factors’ on the one hand and es-
tablishing the opportunity for repatriation of rejected
asylum seekers on the other.
The major thrust of EU containment policy is
framed by the development and security paradigm.
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton summed up this pa-
10 ‘Australia stops accepting refugee claims from Sri Lanka and Afg-
hanistan’ The Guardian, 9 April 2010, p.12.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/09/australia-refu-
gees-afghanistan-sri-lanka (accessed 1 September 2010).





























































radigm in the recent statement: “Development…
today is a strategic, economic and moral imperative
– as central to advancing American interests and sol-
ving global problems as diplomacy and defense. It is
time to elevate development as a central pillar in all
we do in foreign policy (Bunting, 2010: 19)”. The
equation for peace is based on the proposition that
“poverty causes conflict and development brings
peace” and “modern warfare is not fought around pe-
ople but among them” (Bunting, 2010: 19). 
After September 11, security took priority over
development and “narrowed on strategic regions, sub-
populations and programs with a direct security out-
come; including helping ineffective states to better
police their borders and peoples” (Duffield, 2004: 3).
However, rather than the recovery of state authority,
human security is increasingly the outcome of a new
“assemblage of governance” which seeks “to promote
choice and opportunity for the world’s peoples
through intervening, acting upon and regulating the
economic, social and political contingencies of life”
(Duffield, 2004: 5). But, as Duffield (2004: 5) asks,
“How do you secure humans in an insecure world?”
The expansive nature of the human security project
can be gauged by the International Commission on In-
tervention and State Sovereignty’s report The Respon-
sibility to Protect combining humanitarian intervention
with “complex forms of global coordination and cen-
tralization necessary to regulate the conflict, post-con-
flict, migratory, economic, health and educational
contingencies of life” (Duffield, 2004: 5).
The development and security paradigm is de-
signed to prevent further population flows and to per-
mit the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers to
their countries of origin after they have been made
safe through Western intervention. One dimension of
Australian government participation in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan as a member of a US led coali-
tion and the NATO force respectively was the oppor-
tunity it presented to halt the refugee flows from
these two key ‘refugee generating’ countries by re-
gime change and “stabilization” through state-buil-
ding, democratic government and the rule of law. It
added military-humanitarian intervention as an ins-
trument in Australia’s refugee containment and repa-
triation strategies. By joining in the war to overthrow
the Taliban government in Afghanistan, and subse-
quently Saddam Hussain in Iraq, the Australian go-
vernment expected to simultaneously eliminate the
‘push’ factors for Afghan and Iraqi refugees and clo-
sedown the transnational terrorist sanctuaries of
groups threatening to export the “new terrorism”.
Hypergovernance of the border has increa-
singly seen the security lens eclipse the human rights
lens. The militarization of interception and the dis-
course of ‘stop the boats’ (as if they represented an
invasion) has resulted in increased state to state coo-
peration, even with the state refugees are seeking as-
ylum from. In response to the ongoing arrival of Tamil
refugees by boat during 2009 with the end of the civil
war in Sri Lanka the Australian Labor government en-
tered into an agreement with the Sri Lankan govern-
ment designed to stop the refugee flow at source. The
asylum claims of the Tamil refugees were transfor-
med into a problem of states cooperating to combat
people smugglers. The agreement also committed
Australia to help with postwar rehabilitation and re-
construction.11 Asylum policy and illegal boat arrivals
is a hot button policy issue in Australian politics ho-
wever symbolic importance of ‘stopping the boats’ to
assert territorial sovereignty is far greater than the
impact of the actual numbers arriving. Between 2006
and 2011 around 11,000 asylum seekers arrived by
boat and around 850,000 arrived as permanent set-
tlers making asylum seekers about 1.4% of arrival in
that period if all asylum claims are accepted.12
The current Abbott government has gone a
step further and militarized its off-shore management
of asylum seekers placing an Australian Army general
in charge and calling it ‘Operation Sovereign Borders’.
As a consequence information about boat arrivals and
asylum seeker processing have been declared military
‘operational matters’ and therefore secret. The hu-
manitarian logic of asylum seeking to save life has
been completely inverted: instead of saving people
from persecution by their state it is now about saving
them from drowning at sea as a result of exploitation
at the hands of people smugglers selling them passa-
ges on unseaworthy boats. Humanitarianism has
been securitized and turned into a problem of ‘people
smuggling’ – i.e. an international criminal activity.
Stopping the boats has been framed as breaking the
‘business model’ of the people smugglers (Morrison,
2014).Following this inverted logic which turns asylum
seeking into the need for protection from internatio-
nal human traffickers the Australian government has
11 The Hon Stephen Smith, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade, Joint Ministerial Statement, 9 November 2009.
http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2009/fa-
s091109_js.html (accessed 1 August 2011).































































sought assistance of the Sri Lankan Navy, providing
them with patrol boats, to help stop the postwar flow
of Tamil refugees by boat from Sri Lanka.13 Controver-
sially the government handed over 41 Tamil asylum se-
ekers it had intercepted on a boat directly to the Sri
Lankan Navy (Knott, 2014) but were prevented from
handing over another 153 Tamil asylum seekers by an
Australian High Court injunction to determine govern-
ment’s obligations of non-refoulement, the principle
under international law that a victim cannot be rende-
red to their persecutor (Shanahan, 2014).The govern-
ment now explicitly links security and markets arguing
that the “border” is a “national asset” which must effi-
ciently regulate the legal flow of people and goods. In
a speech announcing the creation of the Australian
Border Force, a new government agency combining im-
migration and customs, the Minister for Immigration
and Border Protection declared the border was now
even greater ‘national asset’ because the recent free
trade agreements with Japan and South Korea, and
China still under negotiation(Morrison, 2014).
The Australian Agency for International Deve-
lopment (AusAID) projects in Afghanistan highlight
the connection between security (military patrols and
training), development assistance and the solution for
refugee flow.14 Australia participates in military ope-
rations in Afghanistan under the United Nations man-
dated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Australian military involvement has been in Oruzgan
Province with the mission of “improving agriculture
and rural development, improving basic service deli-
very, supporting good governance and supporting vul-
nerable populations.’15 An important development
outcome mentioned in the report is the successful re-
patriation since 2002 of more than 5 million Afghan
refugees from neighbouring Pakistan and Iran under
the UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation program and the
return home of around 500,000 internally displaced
Afghans. Nevertheless over 2.6 million registered Afg-
han refugees remain in Pakistan and Iran. 
The hypergovernance of the border has also led
to the convergence of the domestication and securi-
tization of Muslims and Islam at home and abroad.
The increasing racialization and criminalization of
“illegal” boats arrivals in public discourse and anti-ra-
dicalization policy aimed at policing the diaspora for
extremism. In Australia the term ‘refugee’ has be-
come code for ‘Muslim’ because the overwhelming
majority of illegal boat arrivals have been Muslims
from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan.16 The arrival
of Tamils from Sri Lanka between 2010-2012 has been
the exception. The logic of the ‘war on terror’ was to
reestablish political order in failed states by disman-
tling of radical Islamist militias, in particular al Qaeda,
in order to prevent further terrorist attacks in the ci-
ties of the North. In the “ungoverned space” of failed
states civil society is not seen as part of the solution
but part of the problem until it “becomes substituted
by visible and policy comprehensible INGO gover-
nance” (Bhatt, 2014: 824).
After the 7 July 2005 attacks against the Lon-
don transport system conducted by radicalized “ho-
megrown” British Pakistan Muslim youth counter-
terrorism began to target the export of radical jihadist
politics, especially radical preachers and recruiters in
the Muslim diaspora. Military intervention abroad to
defeat Islamic militants in conflict zones became part
of the expanded hypergovernance of migrants at
home. The perceived increased risk of radicalization
of diaspora Muslims has only intensified the securiti-
zation and domestication of young Muslim males as
a terror risk category. The geographical focus of state
“anti-radicalization” programs is on “jihadi corridors”,
the space linking diaspora and homeland politics
constituted by the experience of training, ideological
indoctrination and fighting for Islamist causes (Kas-
hmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia) by different ji-
hadi militias (Bhatt, 2010).
The link between 9/11 and state failure in Afg-
hanistan has come back to haunt the West. Hypergo-
vernance through military intervention in Iraq and
political support for Arab Spring democracy move-
ments against authoritarian regimes has not delivered
“favoured governments”. The growing influence and
power of Sunni Islamist militias in Syria, Iraq and Libya
and the loss of state territorial sovereignty through
armed rebellion has renewed fear of diaspora radica-
lization in the West. Recruitment of ‘jihadis’ for these
13 ‘Scott Morrison urged to visit war-torn north during trip to Sri
Lanka’, Guardian Sunday 6 July 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jul/06/scott-morrison-to-head-to-sri-lanka-amid-row-
over-fate-of-asylum-boat  (accessed 23 July 2014)
14 AusAIDProgrammes, Afghanistan http://www.ausaid.gov.au/
country/country.cfm?CountryID=27886219&Region=AfricaMid-
dleEast (accessed 1 September 2010).
15 AusAIDProgrammes, Afghanistan http://www.ausaid.gov.au/
country/country.cfm?CountryID=27886219&Region=AfricaMid-
dleEast (accessed 1 September 2010).
16 Submission to the Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immi-
gration Detention Network September 2011, Department of Im-
migration and Citizenship http://www.immi.gov.au/media/
publications/pdf/2011/diac-jscaidn-submission-sept11.pdf (ac-
cessed 1 June 2012).





























































conflicts by radical clerics and cyber appeals from ‘ji-
hadis’ at the front for “brothers” to join them has led
to much higher recruitment from the Muslim diaspora
in the West as well as other Muslim countries.17 The
response of Western governments has been the co-
ordinated intensification of Muslim domestication,
securitization and hypergovernance to prevent fur-
ther radicalization and recruitment at home, to stop
jihadi recruits leaving, to monitor the activities of their
“nationals” in conflict zones and, on their return, to
investigate them for criminal activity – e.g. consorting
with proscribed terrorist groups overseas. The fear is
that participation in jihadist militias will increase the
risk of terrorist attacks at home on their return. The
border is used to quarantine recruits to either prevent
them from leaving to join jihadist militias by suspen-
ding their passports or detaining and prosecuting
them under anti-terrorism laws on their return to
limit the contamination of the diaspora at home and
possibly initiating terrorist actions on their return.
Transit countries such as Turkey and Lebanon are also
cooperating in the anti-radicalization containment
strategy fearing the consequences of radicalization
amongst their own populations. The Australian go-
vernment has already cancelled passports of those se-
eking to fight in Syria and Iraq (Cox, 2014).
As the hypergovernance of postcolonial states
in crisis becomes more difficult so the international
agenda for peacekeeping, peacemaking and nation-
building becomes more expansive. LakhdarBrahimi,
an Algerian statesman and veteran UN envoy to Afg-
hanistan, commented: “[the plans] become more am-
bitious and multifaceted, seeking to promote justice,
national reconciliation, human rights, gender equality,
the rule of law, sustainable economic development,
and democracy, all at the same time. From day one,
now, immediately, even including in the midst of con-
flict” (Rashid, 2008: 402). Hypergovernance as a stra-
tegy of transnational governance of populations
appears to be becoming more complex and never-en-
ding. The unresolved project of state building in Iraq
and the souring of the Arab Spring, especially in Libya,
Egypt and Syria, as a non-jihadist route to regime
change and social change has witnessed the intensi-
fication of securitization and hypergovernance of mi-
grants/diasporas. Interception, detention and
repatriation through the recycling displaced and tran-
sient populations through local deals with states of
origin or transit ones where ungoverned spaces resist
ordering the emergence of the new military techno-
logies, such as drones and robots, have opened up the
opportunity for perpetual war. In the militarized
hypergovernance of these ungoverned spaces the dis-
tinction between combatant and civilian collapses
and “the moral indifference to civilian deaths beco-
mes part of the rationality of war, as does the outrage
at the death of a soldier” (Bhatt, 2014: 821). As go-
verned spaces, such as the EU area of “freedom, se-
curity and justice” (AFSJ),18 become more harmonized
and intensively regulated ungoverned space becomes
the target of militarized hypergovernance and strip-
ped of “freedom, security and justice”.
Conclusion
The patterns of securitization, domestication
and hypergovernance pursued by the Australian state
in the contemporary management migrants and mi-
gration are embedded in a web of international prac-
tices emerging in the North. Australia not only
borrows laws and policies from the North and extends
transnational governance through the adoption of UN
conventions and treaties, it shares the transnationa-
lized security objects – especially Muslims and refu-
gees – and the produces the collective gaze of
Australian spectator-citizens. While migration is
usually strongly framed as a national question it is in-
creasingly being managed in the North as an interna-
tional one along an imaginary transnational border
between the North and South.
Nation-states are increasingly confronting the
limits of their sovereignty in managing the impact of
globalization. The securitization of migration and mi-
grants represents a strategy by which states in the
North now seek to manage population flows from the
South and to internally police the impact of migration
on their own societies and to intervene in others.  The
bodies of migrants have been made surrogate bor-
ders on which the state inscribes its sovereignty
through inclusion or exclusion.  As social control, se-
curitization involves a shift from the punishment to
the prevention of crimes, from a panoptic lens (the
logic of totalitarian control under the gaze of the17 ‘Up to 11,000 foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among Western
Europeans’, 17 December 2013, International Centre for the Study
of Radicalization http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-
foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/  (ac-
cessed 22 July 2014).
18 European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.http://free-






























































state) to a ban-optic lens (the management of threats
under the gaze of the citizen spectator). But securiti-
zation of migration also represents a mode of gover-
nance based on policing social categories of threat
and risk to produce social cohesion/consensus as a
way to manage the problems of globalization. 
The securitization of migration has emerged as
a political project of spatial integration through the
harmonization of policy and laws managing risk across
states of the North. As Watson (2010) argues, securi-
tization is best thought of as being at one end of the
security spectrum between non-institutionalized and
institutionalized practices. But as Karyotis (2012) ar-
gues the securitization of migration is a fallacy be-
cause of its complexity and uncertainty. The
emergence of securitization is an expression of the in-
adequacy of institutionalized forms of international
and national security to manage new risks and threats
that have emerged with globalization. Perhaps secu-
ritization represents an emergent pattern to be insti-
tutionalized? Yet the very shift from panoptic to
banoptic forms of disciplining suggests this is the new
pattern of transnational security which prioritizes po-
licy, and with it politics, on the latest risk objects. Even
humanitarianism has assumed this form of prioritizing
discourse for urgent political attention on the referent
object of human suffering (Watson, 2011).
The transnationalization of migration policy in
the North constitutes a sphere of overlapping sove-
reignties. The transnational management of migration
and migrants has been an important mechanism for
EU political integration through the harmonization of
laws and policies. Securitization has reinforced the EU
project of integration but it has also led to a wider har-
monization of laws and policies as a shared project of
the North. Securitization has accelerated the process
of constituting a form of transnational governance fo-
cused on risk management by producing transnational
categories for shared regulation – refugees, irregular
migrants, terrorists and Muslims. In the area of migra-
tion the Inter-Governmental Consultations (IGC) on
Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe,
North America and Australia is a good example of
high-level discussion and forum for policy transfer and
harmonization (Humphrey, 2002). The bureaucratic
exchange of policies and laws is also referred to as
“best practice” (Mountz, 2010).  Securitization has
emerged as a mode of governance to produce social
cohesion/consensus around a threat. It combines
technologies of surveillance, states scrutinizing the
conduct of risk categories, with technologies of nor-
malization, the policing of social surfaces through the
mediated circulation of images watched by spectator-
citizens. The profiling of risk categories has led to cul-
tural essentialization to make risks/threats legible and
thereby gain political legitimacy by visibly policing
them. Racism is being entrenched by the optical logics
of securitization.
Securitization is an expression of hypergover-
nance, the transnational management of populations
beyond state borders to contain threats at a distance.
In the case of migration this has involved intercepting
unwanted migrants – illegals and asylum seekers – be-
fore they arrive at the border and trying to keep them
at home. States in the North have consistently sought
to distance asylum seekers victims from voters by de-
humanising them, denying their rights though excep-
tional laws (especial deny them access to national
jurisdictions), criminalising them by association (their
resort to people smugglers), and even producing a dis-
course claiming to save them in the name of combating
people smugglers by denying them their rights. In other
words, interception beyond the border makes refugees
and asylum seekers politically and legally invisible and
allows the state to avoid legal and moral responsibility
to address asylum claims. It becomes a strategy of se-
crecy thereby spatially delimiting the international legal
obligations and avoiding democratic scrutiny.
Reaching beyond the state also involves the
outsourcing of sovereignty by getting other states,
NGOs and private companies to assume responsibili-
ties for managing migration flows. States from the
North are increasingly negotiating the abdication of
their responsibilities towards refugees and asylum se-
ekers (treaty obligations, international law) by unloa-
ding responsibilities onto to others on the basis of
coercion or inducement - accession to the EU; deve-
lopment loans; trade benefits; regional security agre-
ements. But, as the situations in Afghanistan and
Pakistan reveal, it is no longer enough to keep pro-
blems at a distance by exporting development and se-
curity programs. ISAF’s hypergovernance of a failed
state like Afghanistan is in practice contested by Isla-
mic forms of hypergovernance projected by religious
movements connected to the Saudi state’s regional
ambitions for influence (Humphrey, 2012). There are
competing patterns of the franchising of sovereignty
to Western secular as well as Islamic religious NGOS
(Bhatt, 2007). What is at stake is not just local disorder
or the reach of salafi jihadist millenarianism but the
very future of postcolonial states in crisis. In Afghanis-
tan state building and stabilization turned into a pro-
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